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Abstract: Common sense and philosophical methodology: some 
metaphilosophical reflections on analytic philosophy and Deleuze  
 
On the question of precisely what role common sense (or related datum like folk 
psychology, trust in pre-theoretic/intuitive judgments, etc.) should have in reigning in 
the possible excesses of our philosophical methods, the so-called ‘continental’ answer 
to this question, for the vast majority, would be “as little as possible”, whereas the 
analytic answer for the vast majority would be “a reasonably central one”. While this 
difference at the level of both rhetoric and meta-philosophy is sometimes – perhaps 
often – problematised by the actual philosophical practices of representative 
philosophers of either tradition, I will argue that this norm (and its absence) 
nonetheless continues to play an important justificatory role in relation to the use of 
some rather different methodological practices. In particular, many analytic 
philosophers not only explicitly invoke the value of common sense, but they also 
implicitly value it via techniques like conceptual analysis that want to explicate folk 
psychology and/or lay bare what is already embedded in the linguistic norms of a 
given culture, the widespread use of thought experiments and the way they function 
as ‘intuition pumps’, as well as the general aim to achieve ‘reflective equilibrium’ 
between our intuitions and reflective judgments in epistemology and political 
philosophy. Such methods, I will argue, enshrine a conservative, or, more positively, 
a modest understanding of the philosophical project in that it is invested in cohering 
with both a given body of knowledge and common sense. These methods are notably 
less perspicuous in continental philosophy. To bring some of the reasons why this 
might be so to the fore, this paper considers Deleuze’s sustained attack on both good 
and common sense, which he argues are fundamental to the prevalence of a dogmatic 
image of thought. If Deleuze is right about this, and if the analytic tradition distils and 
perfects certain methods that are closely associated with this image of thought, then 
we have here a rather stark methodological contrast that calls for elaboration and 
evaluation.  
Common sense and philosophical methodology: some metaphilosophical 
reflections on analytic philosophy and Deleuze1  
Jack Reynolds, La Trobe University 
 
In Discourse on Method, Descartes famously observed that what is most evenly 
shared and equally distributed in the world (i.e. common) is good sense. This sense is 
not precisely defined by him, nor by most of those who have subsequently invoked it, 
but it seems to encompass our basic reasoning and inferential abilities as well as 
something closely related to what has come to be called ‘folk psychology’, which 
refers to our everyday ability to attribute desires, beliefs, and intentionality to other 
people despite the theoretical possibility of them being but cloaks and springs2. 
Indeed, Descartes argues in his Meditations that if we are methodologically careful 
enough (and with the help of God), this sense will enable us to justify many of our 
varied claims to knowledge. Judging by some recent accounts, however, this ‘sense’ 
is neither quite as common (e.g. universal) nor as good (e.g. naturally oriented to 
truth) as Descartes and many others would have us believe. Whether we consider 
large aspects of the work of the so-called ‘continental’ tradition, starting with the 
‘masters of suspicion’ and phenomenology, and continued in different ways by both 
the structuralists and poststructuralists, or whether we consider the challenge to the 
analytic epistemological tradition proffered by experimental philosophers like 
Stephen Stich, this sense has come in for a battering in recent times. Stich and others 
critique old-fashioned conceptual analysis (and also its residue in the work of 
                                                 
1Thanks are due to the Australian Research Council for funding the Discovery Project ‘Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy’, from which a 
monograph, Analytic Versus Continental? (Acumen) is forthcoming in 2010. Much of this analysis has 
benefitted from discussion with my fellow investigators on these projects, especially James Chase and 
James Williams. I am also indebted to Jon Roffe, Ricky Sebold, Sherah Bloor, Douglas Lackey, and 
two audiences at the University of Tasmania to whom I presented earlier versions of this material. 
2See Hutto, D., and Ratcliffe, M., eds. Folk Psychology Reassessed, New York: Springer 2007.  
Davidson, Dennett, and others) for amounting to an ‘intuition driven romanticism’ 
because of the assumption that both rationality and common sense are univocal, 
despite empirical studies suggesting that there are significant cultural differences 
revealed in our reasoning capacities3. But even if Descartes’ descriptive claim about 
the existence of this sense was shown to be empirically well-grounded in people of all 
cultures, and also convincingly shown to be oriented away from falsity and towards 
‘truth’4, there remains a further question as to its value and centrality to the 
philosophical enterprise. Should this common sense ground and anchor our 
philosophical methods, or does that commit one’s philosophy to theoretical 
conservatism, to being nothing more than the shuffling of the deck of cards, 
redistributing things from time to time? But what else might philosophy be? Critique, 
or ‘first philosophy’? These are both live possibilities, of course, and a central part of 
the self-understanding of many continental philosophers, but it is also important to 
note that the critical disavowal (explicit or otherwise) of the importance of common 
sense frequently leads to accusations of mysticism and obscurantism, charges that are 
quite commonly levelled at many of the major continental philosophers. If 
philosophers are intent to avoid the charge of mysticism, as we ought to be and as 
virtually all continental philosophers would concur, is our remaining choice between 
foundationalism (the desire for some indubitable starting point from which other 
conclusions may be deduced) and seeing philosophy as the coherentist weighing of 
                                                 
3And it is not simply that one can be called good and the other defective without very careful 
attentiveness to the environment in which this reasoning occurs, something that the analytic tradition, 
by and large, has not provided. See Stich, S., The Fragmentation of Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1993. 
4This would be a rather narrow conception of truth, one that would seem to be committed to holding 
that we should not perpetuate gambler’s fallacies in which we assume that several consecutive results 
of ‘heads’ makes a ‘tail’ more likely on the next throw of the coin. Empirically and psychologically 
speaking, the phenomenon of belief perseverance suggests that this is improbable. More 
philosophically, for Deleuze being preoccupied with the true/false distinction in this manner robs 
paradox of its intrinsic role, and tacitly posits the primacy of a good sense that is originarily oriented 
towards truth, whereas Deleuze’s ongoing point is that this sense is socio-culturally produced. 
the balance, the sober judge of what best fits with what within a given system of 
knowledge claims, beliefs, and intuitions?  
Since the interesting philosophical issue will be to explore what this means 
meta-philosophically and just how powerful an explanatory tool this assessment of 
philosophy’s ‘divided house’ is, it is worth risking a generalisation at the outset. On 
the question of what role common sense should have in reigning in the possible 
excesses of our philosophical methods, the continental answer to this question, for the 
vast majority of the usual suspects associated with this tradition, would be something 
like ‘as little as possible’, whereas the analytic answer, for the vast majority, would be 
‘a reasonably central one’. While this difference at the level of both rhetoric and 
meta-philosophy is sometimes – perhaps often – problematised by the concrete 
philosophy of representative philosophers of either tradition, I argue that this norm 
(and its absence) nonetheless plays an important justificatory role in relation to the 
use of some rather different methodological practices, thus offering a better account 
of what is at stake in the ‘divide’ (explaining their respective endorsements of, and 
resistances to, transcendental reasoning, as well as the paradigmatic way in which 
work in analytic philosophy proceeds communally) than many of the alternatives.   
Of course, it is notoriously difficult to specify any methodological unity at the 
heart of ‘continental’ philosophy, which is something of a motley crew, comprised of 
various different meta-reflections on philosophical method and with various diverse 
methods employed in practice: phenomenological, dialectical, hermeneutic, 
structuralist, psychoanalytic, and transcendental, the last two of which are perhaps 
most significant in both causing and then legitimating what Michael Friedman refers 
to as “the parting of the ways”5. Nonetheless, in different ways all of these methods 
are designed to shed light upon what might be described as our time-embeddedness, 
and all are designed to exhibit something that is not simultaneously clear and distinct. 
They are hence sympathetic to varying degrees to Leibniz’s (and Bergson’s) riposte to 
Descartes that clarity and distinctness are in fact mutually exclusive6, a philosophical 
objection that begins to explain some of the widely observed stylistic differences 
between analytic and continental philosophy. In addition, what gives continental 
philosophy its methodological ‘quasi-unity’ contra Simon Glendinning7, and helps to 
distinguish it from much of the analytic tradition, is its thorough-going wariness of 
any close link between philosophical method and either common sense (or folk 
psychology, etc.), with the added rider that these reservations are not accompanied by 
either the strong naturalist or empirical functionalist turn that typifies the majority of 
those analytic philosophers who dispute the philosophical importance of common 
sense and conclude that there is no phenomenology, say, or that colour perception is 
illusory. Such a concern is perhaps partly presaged by Kant’s critical philosophy 
(noting that there is a sense in which Kant’s transcendental philosophy leaves 
everything as it is, and is certainly not incompatible with common sense), but it 
attains renewed vigour around the end of the nineteenth century and in particular with 
the work of those whom Paul Ricoeur called the “masters of suspicion” – Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud. Moreover, it seems remiss not to include others in this list, 
especially Bergson given the challenges his work poses to the categorising tendencies 
                                                 
5Friedman, M., A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger, New York: Open Court, 
2000. 
6James Williams explains the Deleuzian account of this typically well in The Transversal Thought of 
Gilles Deleuze (Manchester: Clinamen Press 2005). For Deleuze, analysis presupposes the discrete 
nature of possibilities, denies background and connectedness of all problems to one another. Analytic 
philosophy’s preoccupation with clear and distinct representations deprives things of their context, 
ignores relationality. In particular, the association of clarity and distinctness falsely abstracts from the 
process of genesis and the future evolutions that are always at work in the present, interrupting it. 
7Glendinning, S., The Idea of Continental Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006.  
of the intellect and the simplification that he thinks inevitably results due to its 
operations, along with Husserl whose phenomenological reduction was designed 
precisely to suspend the assumptions of the ‘natural attitude’, including even the 
common sense conviction that we have perceptual experience of an ‘external world’. 
Of course, the relationship between phenomenology and common sense is again not a 
simple oppositional one, in that phenomenological descriptions typically seek to 
remind us of pre-reflective dimensions of experience that have been both forgotten 
and presupposed. Nonetheless, it is important to note that phenomenology generally 
aims to describe levels of experience ‘beneath’ the common sense judgments of 
particular subjects, and which are claimed to be the conditions of possibility for such 
opinions and judgments. With the post-structuralist thinkers, like Deleuze, this 
scepticism about any close methodological relationship between philosophy and 
common sense is heightened. 
Of course, it is easy to throw around ideas like critical philosophy as a badge 
of honour, and the issue of conservatism and radicality in philosophy is more 
complicated than it might at first glance appear. We all have to pick starting and 
stopping places in philosophy, and, if we agree there is no one true way, then the 
question becomes one of just where we draw the line in the sand on issues like the 
respectability or otherwise of transcendental argumentation, the centrality or 
otherwise of commonsense and intuition, and the nature of one’s relationship with 
science. While this essay is motivated by a general concern to highlight the divergent 
drawing of the lines that analytic and continental philosophers engage in vis-à-vis 
common-sense, a survey of continental philosophy cannot be attempted here. Instead, 
Deleuze’s direct and sustained attack on both good and common sense will be our 
prime focus. That is because in its provocative form it provides the most illuminating 
example of some of the differences that continue to separate analytic and continental 
philosophy today. After all, if it is legitimate to maintain that the vast majority of the 
main figures associated with continental philosophy insist (admittedly to greater and 
lesser degrees) that philosophical method ought not to be anchored to common sense 
or other closely related datum, this is not the case with many of the key thinkers and 
methodological practices of contemporary analytic philosophy. On the contrary, many 
(perhaps most) analytic philosophers either explicitly invoke the value of common 
sense, or, as I will suggest in what follows, implicitly value it via techniques like 
conceptual analysis that want to explicate folk psychology and lay bare what is 
already embedded in the linguistic norms of a given culture, the widespread use of 
thought experiments and the way they function as ‘intuition pumps’, as well as the 
general aim to achieve ‘reflective equilibrium’ between our intuitions and reflective 
judgments in epistemology and political philosophy. Such methods enshrine a 
conservative, or, more positively, a modest understanding of the philosophical project 
in that it is invested in cohering with both a given body of knowledge and common 
sense (if not of the folk variety, at least of a given paradigmatic body of experts). 
After all, Neurath’s raft, the favoured epistemological metaphor of choice, would be 
ripped apart by quick and radical revisions to the theoretical architectonic of a given 
intellectual milieu, and also by any attempt to start philosophy from scratch (i.e. do 
first philosophy) that did not consider the repercussion for some other domain of 
knowledge acquisition. The boat can be safely replaced at sea only by taking apart 
one piece at a time8. This accretionist or piecemeal approach to philosophy is not 
something that most continental philosophers would consider to be part of 
philosophy’s raison d’etre. While it might be rightly protested that all philosophers 
                                                 
8See Pinkard, R., “Analytics, Continentals, and Modern Skepticism”, Monist, Vol. 82, No. 2, 1999, 
p191. 
are masters of suspicion, wary of doxa, clichés, and thus (at least to some extent) 
wary of common sense9, we should note that the suspicion is directed in very different 
directions: a suspicion of first philosophy and transcendental arguments as opposed to 
a suspicion of understandings of philosophy as reducible to coherence within a given 
domain of knowledge claims or valid deductive argumentation.  
If this argument regarding philosophical method is borne out in what follows, 
the foundation will also have been laid for an informed understanding of the limits 
and possibilities of the methods employed in each tradition. After all, there are 
particular dangers in an approach that focuses upon (or assumes) this common sense – 
for instance a bias toward problems of the ‘right size’, and so to necessary and 
sufficient condition conceptual analysis rather than more diffuse exploration. 
Likewise, there are different dangers to an approach to philosophy that stridently 
distances itself from this sense and its associated norms – mysticism, rhetoric, and 
verbosity, perhaps, but also a research paradigm that is splintered rather than 
integrated towards common projects. Of course, it is true that continental philosophers 
have communities and shared justificatory norms within a given ‘ism’ to some extent 
(e.g. existentialism), and also by association with a particular philosophical name (e.g. 
Heidegger). These shared norms depend upon some kind of valuation of the common 
sense of a community, and also result in paradigmatic forms of thinking that we might 
calls forms of theoretical conservativism. But my concern here is more with the 
original philosophers associated with the tradition, rather than the sometimes 
unproductive exegetical work that can be done in continental philosophy, and while 
one is always part of a community of some sort, the critical relation to a dead 
historical community and the comparative lack of attention paid to work within a 
                                                 
9We might also credibly assert the reverse – all philosophers are also conservative about some thing or 
another. Janna Thompson made both of these observations (separately) to me and I am inclined to 
agree. We also know that Hegel’s conception of philosophy is highly conservative.  
synchronic dialogic community, means that norms like common sense are less 
prevalent in the continental self-image of the job of the philosopher. If this is so, there 
is reason to suspect that some kind of conversation (even if antagonistic) is necessary 
for philosophy to avoid some of the weaknesses that can be associated with the 
methods of both traditions when they become insulated from engagement with their 
respective philosophical ‘others’. If analytic philosophy is methodologically 
paradigmatic (i.e. it assumes the validity of a shared group of methods that in 
different ways acknowledge the importance of common sense), and large parts of 
contemporary continental philosophy have an a priori rejection of certain 
philosophical methods without being able to justify such decisions and preferences, 
then each needs the other. Debate might rarely yield agreement when the governing 
paradigm is contested, but it should help to free both traditions of a methodological 
insularism that can distort theorising, and this essay constitutes one effort to further 
this goal.  
 
DELEUZE’S CRITIQUE OF GOOD AND COMMON SENSE 
  
In The Logic of Sense, Difference and Repetition, and elsewhere, Deleuze repeatedly 
discusses two interrelated assumptions that conspire together to produce what he 
considers to be a false or dogmatic image of thought. These two foundational 
assumptions are termed good sense and common sense, although we should note that 
they have a more formal register rather than referring primarily to a given capacity or 
trait. As he states in chapter three of Difference and Repetition (hereafter DR)10:  
                                                 
10Deleuze, G., Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton, New York: Columbia University, 1994.  
The implicit presupposition of philosophy may be found in the idea of a 
common sense as Cogitatio natura universalis. On this basis philosophy is able 
to begin. There is no point in multiplying the declarations of philosophers, 
from ‘Everybody has by nature the desire to know’ to ‘Good sense is of all 
things in the world the most equally distributed’… Conceptual philosophical 
thought has as its implicit presupposition a pre-philosophical and natural 
image of thought, borrowed from the pure element of common sense… We 
may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox, or moral image (DR 
131).  
This is a strong claim: conceptual philosophical thought almost inevitably rests on 
certain unquestioned assumptions, most notably an ideal image of thought (which is 
also a moral image11) that remains tethered to common sense. While Deleuze is not 
specifically engaging with analytic philosophy in this passage, his repeatedly 
expressed concerns about any too intimate alliance between philosophy, science and 
common sense12 suggest that he intends this more general description to apply to it. 
For Deleuze, however, the manner in which this image of thought is betrothed to 
common sense means that:  
Philosophy is left without the means to realise its project of breaking with 
doxa. No doubt philosophy refuses every particular doxa; no doubt it upholds 
                                                 
11While the moral component to this image of thought may not immediately be apparent, it is worth 
noting that many of the more important recent reflections on analytic methodology do, at least in my 
view, evince a moral element to them, either explicitly as in Cohen’s and Rescher’s linking of analytic 
method with the practice of democracy, or implicitly in the language and metaphors that are deployed 
despite the feel of neutral argument for its own sake. Cohen’s The Dialogue of Reason (Oxford 1986), 
for example, argues that there is a close connection between analytic method, democracy and non-
totalitarian stances. On the other hand, one possible riposte to this is John McCumber’s argument in 
Time in the Ditch (Northwestern 2001) that the rise of analytic philosophy in the US in the McCarthy 
era is more than a coincidence. Both claims seem overstated. 
12Indeed, it amounts to something like a Holy Trinity for Bertrand Russell, who cannot forgive Plato, 
Spinoza, and Hegel because “they remained ‘malicious’ in regard to the world of science and common 
sense” (Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, London: Routledge 1993, p48-9) and who 
criticises Bergson because his philosophy of intuition rests on a complete condemnation of the 
knowledge that is derived from science and common sense. 
no particular propositions of good sense and common sense… Nevertheless, it 
retains the essential aspect of doxa – namely the form; and the essential aspect 
of common sense – namely the element; and the essential aspect of recognition 
(DR 134).  
Deleuze’s view, then, is that much of the history of Western philosophy, as well as its 
contemporary manifestations in analytic philosophy and phenomenology, has 
abstracted from the empirical content of doxa but implicitly preserved its form 
(despite the attempt to ‘bracket’ the natural attitude, phenomenology is thought to 
nonetheless perpetuate an ur-doxa). To put it another way, methodological 
manifestations of good and common sense are the form of doxa that persists in 
various philosophical systems whatever the actual content or conclusions reached. He 
goes on to suggest, this “form of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the 
recognisable and the recognised; form will never inspire anything but conformities” 
(DR 134). Thinking is reduced to recognising, representing, and to calculative 
allocation and consistency. Of course, many objections may be raised to this analysis 
of Deleuze’s, not least that it presupposes his conviction that important philosophical 
problems do not fundamentally require, or even admit of, solutions, but rather call for 
creative transformations of the problem – hence philosophy is fundamentally about 
concept creation as he makes most clear (with Guattari) in What is Philosophy? In 
addition, it presupposes an elaborate metaphysics regarding the importance of 
difference – as a transcendental condition of the problem, or the Idea – despite the 
ongoing devaluations it receives. Notwithstanding where one stands on these issues, 
however, it remains the case that Deleuze’s general worries about this dogmatic 
image of thought are shared, at least to some extent, by continental philosophers as 
otherwise different as Husserl, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, and 
Derrida, to name a few.  
What, then, is Deleuze’s view of the inter-relation and distinction that obtains 
between good and common sense, and how are they manifested in particular 
philosophical methods? Common sense is said to be that which allows us to decide on 
the categories that will be used to determine a solution, as well as the value of those 
categories. Common sense thus bears directly on methodological issues, including 
how a problem should be divided up such that a solution might be ascertained. It 
functions predominantly by recognition (e.g. we recognise that this fits into that 
category), and is described by Deleuze as “a faculty of identification that brings 
diversity in general under the form of the same”13. In other words, it identifies, 
recognises, and subsumes various diverse singularities (or particularities) and gives 
them a unity. On his view the notion of a ‘subject’ is a prime example of this process. 
Good sense then allocates things into the categories, puts things in their rightful place, 
and selects. It functions by prediction, and by choosing and preferring (DR 33, 226), 
and it is frequently assumed to be naturally oriented to truth. It starts from massive 
differentiation and then resolves, or synthesises it. When taken together, Deleuze 
argues that this model of recognition (including labelling, and definitional analyses) 
and prediction is profoundly conservative. It precludes the advent of the new; good 
sense and common sense are concerned with the recognition of truths rather than the 
production of them.  
Now, many analytic philosophers might happily accept this designation of 
their activity as being concerned with the recognition of truths, but Deleuze says that 
the fundamental role accorded to something like recognition means that common 
                                                 
13Deleuze, G., The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester, London: Continuum, 2004 edition, p77-8.  
sense finds its objects in the categories of: 1. identity with regard to concepts; 2. 
opposition with regard to the determination of concepts; 3. analogy with regard to 
judgment; 4. resemblance with regard to objects (DR 137). Under the above 
quadripartite fetters, “difference becomes an object of representation always in 
relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a 
perceived similitude” (DR 138). It is important to be clear about how these “fetters” 
work. In regard to the issue of the identity of the concept, one example of this would 
be the tendency to maintain, without a justifying argument, that although a dog has 
various empirical manifestations (breeds, sizes, shapes, colours, etc.), the concept or 
Idea of ‘dog’ is nonetheless self-identical14. Despite the work of Wittgenstein, Austin, 
and others, it is arguable that something like this assumption is at play in much 
conceptual analysis as it explicates our language in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and we will see that Stich makes a closely related criticism. In relation to 
Deleuze’s suggestion that the dogmatic image of thought functions through a reliance 
upon analogical judgment, it is clear that thought experiments are predicated on 
comparisons between cases and thus on analogical reasoning and judgment. We 
recognise that a particular thought experiment, for example, is like another (or not) in 
sufficient respects to stand as a suitable marker for some more general problem of 
morality, personal identity, etc. This methodological technique hence partly functions 
by opposition, as Deleuze suggests is typical of this image of thought. Deleuze’s 
fourth claim about this dogmatic image of thought is that perception resembles 
thought (and vice versa), which is another way of saying that it presupposes a 
                                                 
14It is in this sense that Richard Campbell suggests that there is a Platonism at the heart of analytic 
philosophy. See Campbell, R., ‘The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash Between Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy’, British Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2001, p341-59. 
harmony between self (or mind) and the world15. In this respect, Deleuze seems to be 
getting at something closely akin to what Richard Rorty critiques as the idea of 
philosophy (and indeed the representational conception of the mind generally) as a 
mirror of nature16.  
According to Deleuze, these structural features of the dogmatic image of 
thought apply to us all (both within and outside of philosophy) to greater or lesser 
extents. Nonetheless, the important question for us will be whether this so-called 
dogmatic image of thought is not just presupposed by most analytic philosophers, but 
valorised as a modus operandi by some of its most regularly used methods. If the 
analytic tradition distils and perfects certain methods that are closely associated with 
this image of thought, and proclaims these features as positive virtues of thought, then 
we have here a rather stark contrast that calls for elaboration. While it might be 
protested that Deleuze and analytic philosophers are talking about very different 
things when they respectively critique or endorse common sense (and associated 
notions like folk psychology, the philosophical value of our basic 
intuitions/opinions/pre-theoretic beliefs, etc.), there is a genuine philosophical dispute 
here. Even if Deleuze is discussing common sense in a formal rather than an 
anthropological manner (e.g. as some trait humans possess), his argument is certainly 
that the latter claim still partakes in good and common sense as he defines them. 
 
COMMON SENSE AND THEORICAL CONSERVATISM IN ANALYTIC 
METHODOLOGY  
 
                                                 
15This is how Deleuze characterises the co-imbrication of common and good sense in The Logic of 
Sense. 
16Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. 
Notwithstanding the optimistic attempts to unify analytic philosophy as concerned 
with linguistic analysis (Dummett17), or reason-giving (Cohen18), analytic philosophy 
is itself typified by various internal fissures. There are, for example, significant 
divides between the scientifically-inclined and those who retain allegiances to 
linguistic or conceptual analysis, between foundationalists and pragmatists about 
justification and truth, and between formal and informal traditions (associated 
particularly with the late Wittgenstein and Oxford ordinary language philosophy).  
Here, however, I want to focus upon two particular methods and two overarching 
norms that most analytic philosophers subscribe to, even if they do not necessarily put 
the norms into practice; the methodological use of thought experiments and ‘reflective 
equilibrium’, and the norm of common sense as an important touchstone for 
philosophical reflection, as well as the associated stylistic norms of simplicity and 
clarity. These four features are usually interconnected as one might expect. Analytic 
appeals to clarity and simplicity underwrite the interest in conceptual analysis, which 
typically includes not just necessary and sufficient conditions analyses, but also the 
use of both thought experiments and reflective equilibrium. Although thought 
experiments often seek to complicate a given conceptual analysis that is purported to 
be complete (such as Gettier’s counter-examples to the definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief), suggesting that the necessity in question is overstated, it seems to 
me that Frank Jackson is right to suggest that in philosophy, as opposed to science, 
most thought experiments are best seen as devices of conceptual analysis, telling us 
what is conceptually possible or revealing the inferred consequence of a certain 
                                                 
17Dummett, M., The Origins of Analytical Philosophy, London: Duckworth, 1993. 
18Cohen, J., The Dialogue of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
definition19. The allegiance to an idea of something like common sense (and the 
assumption of its univocity and orientation to truth) often plays a significant role in 
justifying the maxim of simplicity, and in according intuitions an important if not 
constitutive role, whether it be in the use of thought experiments (and judgments of 
similitude) or the attempt to establish reflective equilibrium. That much analytic 
philosophy gives a reasonably central role to common sense is perhaps not overly 
surprising, given that from the outset Russell allied the emergent movement with 
common sense, and that others who have been labelled common sense philosophers 
include some of the greats of the tradition: in no particular order, Moore, Chisholm, 
Ayer Austin, Ryle, Malcolm, Wittgenstein, Searle, Quine, and even Lewis.  
Of course, these norms and methods do not exhaust the armoury of analytic 
philosophy20, and they also quite frequently seem to be abandoned due to 
considerations from the sciences (e.g. there is no such thing as colour). But even the 
deferential relationship to science that is typical of many analytic philosophers might 
be brought within the purview of this argument. While common sense (understood 
either as some capacity that each of us innately has, or the shared opinion of the 
majority) and science frequently pull in radically different directions, there is another 
kind of common sense (understood as the opinions of a particular expert community), 
that is taken very seriously by many scientifically-inclined analytic philosophers who 
would not accept that their projects have any great indebtedness to either of the first 
two views of common sense. These divergent conceptions of common sense perhaps 
reflect the Moorean and Russellian inheritances in analytic philosophy.  
                                                 
19Jackson, F., “Thought experiments and possibilities”, forthcoming Analysis. Of course, Timothy 
Williamson and others maintain that thought experiments are best seen as investigations of what’s 
metaphysically possible, not of what’s conceptually possible. 
20There are various methods that I cannot consider here, including the logical formalisation of 
arguments, semantic ascent, etc 
On a more general level, it is difficult to deny that simplicity, clarity, modesty, 
conservatism, and common sense have been envisaged as explanatory virtues since 
Quine influentially gave voice to these norms in Word and Object. As Richard 
Matthews observes, “the primary constraint that we use, qua scientist (for Quine), is 
considerations of simplicity or conservatism. In Quine’s terminology we rely upon the 
maxim of Minimum Mutilation. We choose to affirm such statement as will minimise 
the total disturbance to the theoretical system and thereby which best enables a given 
scientific community to efficiently manage the flux of experience”21 and philosophy 
is held to be roughly continuous with science. But such a view is certainly not 
restricted to Quine. Similar views make an appearance at important moments in the 
work of David Lewis, despite the fact that the invocation of possible worlds is not, at 
least at first glance, very commonsensical. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis says:  
Common sense has no absolute authority in philosophy. It’s not that the folk 
know in their blood what the highfalutin’ philosophers may forget. And it’s 
not that common sense speaks with the voice of some infallible faculty of 
‘intuition’. It’s just that theoretical conservatism is the only sensible policy for 
theorists of limited powers, who are duly modest about what they accomplish 
after a fresh start. Part of this conservatism is reluctance to accept theories that 
fly in the face of common sense… The proper test, I suggest, is a simple 
maxim of honesty: never put forward a philosophical theory that you cannot 
believe in your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments22. 
Despite the first three sentences of this quote (which runs counter to much of what 
follows), good sense and common sense, as Deleuze understands them, are both in 
                                                 
21Matthews, R., “Heidegger and Quine on the (Ir)relevance of Logic for Philosophy”, A House 
Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, ed. C. Prado, Humanity Books, 2003, p161. 
22Lewis, D., On the Plurality of Worlds, London: Blackwell, 2001, p134-5. Much of the following 
paragraph is indebted to James Williams’ analysis of this passage in The Transversal Thought of Gilles 
Deleuze (see p111).  
evidence in Lewis’ comment. Recall that for Deleuze there are two kinds of 
judgment: a judgment about categories and their value, and a judgment that puts 
things in their place. The moment of good sense comes when Lewis takes a complex 
thing, but puts his foot down, and says: just be honest, tell the truth, be 
commonsensical, for this is itself an intrinsic good. Indeed, these terms – honesty, 
truth, theoretical conservatism, and common sense – are treated roughly as synonyms 
here, and the assumption is that when one is honest with oneself and seriously weighs 
common sense one is heading towards philosophical truth23. But why think this? Few 
continental philosophers would, and it might also be noted that the test Lewis 
proposes does not sound like a very rigorous one; we cannot fail to note a certain 
circularity when a common sense test serves as the basis for adjudicating between 
different common sense opinions and intuitions. Nor can this comment be dismissed 
as an aberration for Lewis. In Counterfactuals, he likewise states: “One comes to 
philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of 
philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great 
extent, but only to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system”24. 
In his defence of conceptual analysis, Frank Jackson proffers a similar account 
of explanatory norms, at least in regard to ethics. He suggests: “we must start from 
somewhere in current folk morality, otherwise we start from somewhere unintuitive, 
and that can hardly be a good place to start”25. While one can respect the desire for 
the philosopher to abandon efforts to attain a view from nowhere and instead start 
with certain commonly shared views, it is nonetheless worth noting the oppositional 
                                                 
23Moreover, as Williams’ observes, on Lewis’ account, “conception is restricted to the concept and to 
properties; judgment is associated with common sense, with restricted test-cases and with pre-set 
logical rules; imagination is gravely restricted in terms of prior definitions of truth and consistency; and 
perception is associated with exact properties rather than new variations” (p111).  
24Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1973, p88.  
25Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998, p35.  
logic of this formulation that shuts down a whole range of other possible responses 
(including ‘critique’ and ‘first philosophy’) and makes possible a clear and distinct 
judgment as to where one ought to start philosophy from – in this case, from the 
intuitions of the folk, which seems to serve an equally conservative function to the 
invocation of common sense or pre-theoretic beliefs.  
For Nicholas Rescher, philosophy’s “coherentist methodology requires it to 
accomplish its question-resolving work with a maximum utilisation of, and a 
minimum disruption to, the materials that our other cognitive resources provide”26. If 
we want rationally defeasible and well-substantiated answers, “this requires that we 
transact our question-resolving business in a way that is harmonious with and does no 
damage to our pre-philosophical connections in matters of everyday life affairs and of 
scientific inquiry”. In other words, philosophy ought to harmonise with both common 
sense and the world, which seems tantamount to arguing that philosophy must mirror 
nature – nature as revealed by both the sciences and by our common sense, envisaged 
as a capacity or trait that seems to be an inevitable and largely unchanging part of 
humanity. Philosophy must build an overall picture of how the various knowledge 
domains and common sense fit together27. Rescher goes on to say that, “the impetus 
to economy is an inherent part of intelligent comportment… optimisation in what one 
thinks, does, and values, is the crux of rationality”28. Without dismissing the value of 
such philosophical activities, their claim to be the sole appropriate philosophical 
method can certainly be doubted. As Max Horkheimer suggests in Critical Theory, to 
take this efficient question resolution as the telos of philosophical thought seems to 
involve a reification of instrumental reason29. When reason is understood in Rescher’s 
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28Rescher, p11. 
29Horkheimer, M., Critical Theory, London: Continuum 1975. 
manner it seems almost inevitable that all that does not fit this definition becomes 
mysticism, obscurantism, literature, or a related term of rebuke. And, at least in 
Rescher’s hands, such a conception of reason also seems to directly entail a 
remarkable theoretical conservatism:  
Questions having presuppositions whose truth status is unknown or 
indeterminate – yet none that are actually (known to be) false may be 
characterised as problematic. To raise such a question in the prevailing 
epistemic circumstance is inappropriate because this would be premature in 
that the question could well become undone by discovering the falsity of such 
a problematic presupposition30.  
One need not be a card-carrying Nietzschean to see that this idea of thought seems to 
be hamstrung by the fear of failure or error, thus forming something akin to an 
epistemological version of slave morality in which error avoidance is the prime good. 
While the risk of mysticism may have been assuaged by Rescher’s theoretical 
conservatism, such a manner of philosophising need not be one that maximises one’s 
chances of attaining to philosophical truth, just as, given certain conditions, a 
conservative strategy that focuses on avoiding mistakes will not be propitious in the 
stock market either31. 
Now, there are, of course, points that might be raised in Rescher’s defence 
here, but we should note that all of them seem to rely upon what Deleuze called good 
and common sense, the formal features of the dogmatic image of thought. Common 
sense, Rescher says, is said to secure his favoured methodological principle – 
Occam’s Razor – of trying the simple things first. As he comments: “we subscribe to 
the inductive presumption in favour of simplicity, uniformity, normality, etc., not 
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because we are convinced that matters always stand on a basis that is simple, uniform, 
normal, etc. – surely we know no such thing! – but because it is on this basis alone 
that we can conduct our cognitive business in the most advantageous, the most 
economical way”. He adds that “wherever possible we analogise the present case to 
other similar ones” and concludes that, “in sum, we favour uniformity, analogy and 
the other aspects of simplicity because they ease our cognitive labours”32. It is not 
difficult to note the similarities between Rescher’s inductive presumption in favour of 
simplicity, uniformity, and normality, and Deleuze’s view of the dogmatic image of 
thought, which persists in the methodological adherance to resemblance, identity, 
analogy, etc.  
Similar tendencies are also apparent in the work of Pascal Engel, who in an 
essay on the ‘divide’ points to a method aligned with common sense and one that 
lacks it, in a manner not unlike that proposed in this essay. However, his conclusion 
that objective cognitive norms are enshrined in the common sense methodology of 
analytic philosophy rather than in its continental alternative is rather hastier than the 
one I will proffer33. He says: 
The standards by which we evaluate our philosophical beliefs should not be 
different from the standards by which we evaluate our commonsense beliefs. 
Common sense incorporates implicit norms which go with the very use of 
such notions as ‘belief’, ‘knowledge’, or ‘judgment’. One of the tasks of 
philosophy is to assess these norms in an explicit and reflective way, and to 
evaluate our commonsense beliefs in the light of these norms. The evaluation 
may lead to revisions of our common sense scheme, and the formation of more 
sophisticated and theoretical beliefs. But even when we reach these new 
                                                 
32Rescher, p200-1. 
33See Engel, P., “Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Norms”, Monist, Vol. 82, No. 2, 1999, p220. 
beliefs, there are no other norms by which we can assess them than those 
which were implicit in our ordinary practice of forming and evaluating 
commonsense beliefs34.  
In such a formulation, Engel allies a process that has come to be called reflective 
equilibrium very tightly with common sense (we will come back to this), but by 
highlighting this connection for us Engel also points to a weakness with the method of 
reflective equilibrium, as well as various other closely related techniques of 
argumentation. Indeed, as Stich points out in The Fragmentation of Reason, analytic 
epistemology seeks the criteria of cognitive evaluation in the analysis or explication 
of our ordinary concepts of epistemic evaluation – such as ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’, etc. 
– which are said to be intuitively accessible to all of us if we care to engage in the 
required conceptual reflection. But, as Stich insists, this involves a form of theoretical 
chauvinism, or what Deleuze would call doxa, in that our intuitions about the right 
standards for cognitive evaluation are socio-culturally produced and to use these to 
legitimate the given epistemological standards seems to beg the question. Engel, for 
example, claims that the norms in question come from our understanding of the 
concepts of ‘belief’ and ‘judgment’ and are said to necessarily hold for cognitive 
inquiry in any time and place – a form of cognitive monism that he provides no 
reason for thinking is true. Moreover, on Stich’s analysis, and that of other 
experimental philosophers, the concepts of knowledge and belief seem to be 
structured rather differently from culture to culture35. We will return to this, but for 
the moment it is time to consider the widespread use of thought experiments, which 
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both solicit our intuitions from us and test those that we already have by comparison 
and analogy with other cases. 
 
COMMON SENSE AND THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS: THE USES AND ABUSES 
OF THE INTUITION PUMP 
 
Thought experiments have been part of both philosophy and science for a long time, 
but they are utilised with greater frequency (and precision) in contemporary analytic 
philosophy than ever before. Despite the ongoing protestations of figures as diverse as 
Daniel Dennett, Bernard Williams, and Timothy Williamson, it is difficult to dispute 
that they are a key methodological feature of analytic philosophy, constituting a 
restricted class of the more general concern with counterfactual reasoning. According 
to Roy Sorensen, thought experiments are the natural test “for the clarificatory 
practices constituting conceptual analysis… a test for which there is no substitute”36. 
They aim at clarifying a given position (or concept), often by overturning a given 
statement by disproving one of their consequences via an expedition to possible 
worlds. If a consequence of a given proposition might be that a particular situation 
should not obtain in any possible world (something is ruled out as necessarily 
impossible), a ‘necessity-refuting’ use of a thought experiment tries to show that the 
scenario is actually entirely possible/conceivable after all37. As such, thought 
experiments are useful for drawing out inconsistencies in our conceptual distinctions, 
for prompting us to clarify what we do think and why, and thus also promising to 
purge us of bias and inconsistency.  
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 While there are many different kinds of thought experiment, some of the most 
famous examples have an incredulous science-fiction edge to them, which is perhaps 
partly responsible for their controversial status. We might think here of Hilary 
Putnam’s attempt to envisage a brain that is sustained in a vat that would have no 
need of a body, his twin earth scenario, or Derek Parfit’s ‘teletransporter’ scenario. As 
devices of argumentation, these are often useful and enlightening for armchair 
philosophising: for example, desert island scenarios allow us to bracket away the 
question of social influences, and the introduction of hypnotists or Robert Nozick’s 
pleasure machine allow the philosopher the freedom to implant certain psychological 
states into an agent without worries about empirical plausibility. And clearly the 
production of thought experiments requires imagination and creativity, even if it is 
arguable that more mundane intuitions show up in the judgments and conclusions 
drawn from them. 
 It is notable that they are not, however, regularly deployed in continental 
philosophy, which instead typically engages with literature and the arts in greater 
detail, and creativity in this tradition revolves more around concept-creation and 
phenomenological descriptions. Of course, there are persistent uses of certain stories 
or fictions that at first glance look like thought experiments, like Hegel’s influential 
‘master-slave’ dialectic in Phenomenology of Spirit (and like Nietzsche’s eternal 
return of difference, or Deleuze’s engagement with the Robinson Crusoe tale38), but 
they don’t seem to function equivalently. In a certain sense, Hegel’s account of the 
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development of self-consciousness via a battle for recognition is a fiction, but it also 
has another status, being claimed to be both historically evidenced and inferred as a 
transcendental condition to explain social life and the necessary co-imbrication of the 
‘I-we’ relation. Is it short and pithy, and does it allow for a rigorous deductive 
conclusion to falsify a given statement or conceptual analysis? Is it a test for 
consistency or best understood as of the form: is x conceivable (or logically possible)? 
No. It is meant to be both grounded in experiential datum of a phenomenological and 
historical kind, and, at the same time, world-disclosing, allowing us to look at the 
world and our place in it anew. It seems clear that what is going on with continental 
philosophy’s preoccupation with genealogical analyses and transcendental arguments 
is hence rather different from the a priori concern with possibility of thought 
experiments.  
Although few of the most famous continental figures explicitly explain their 
reluctance to use thought experiments in any sustained way, their more general 
reflections on methodological matters suggest they harbour the conviction that 
something often goes awry in philosophies that uncritically ape the use of thought 
experiments in science. To put it another way, there is thought to be an intrinsic 
problem (or at least risk) with thought experiments that stems from the manner in 
which they strip a problem back to its basics. In other words, the charge would be put 
that they appear decisive only because of their abbreviated and schematic form, which 
would, if filled out, lead to either inconsistency or a failure to discredit a given view. 
More generally, it is often argued that this abstraction belies the complexity of social 
life and frequently functions on the basis of certain tacit philosophical presuppositions 
that are either highly controversial (such as the assumption of a rational, self-
interested agent who is extricable from their past), or are merely logically possible 
rather than practically conceivable39.  
In distinguishing the phenomenological technique of eidetic analysis 
(imaginative variation) from the typical analytic use of thought experiments, J. N. 
Mohanty claims that the latter is based on mere logical possibility, not on what he 
calls eidetic possibility40. Mohanty’s claim is that while we may be able to logically 
conceive of the possibility of, say body-splitting in Derek Parfit’s teletransporter 
device, we cannot concretely imagine this. In other words, it cannot be ‘lived’, or a 
‘concrete intuition’ as Husserl might say, although an analytic philosopher might 
respond, in the manner of Dennett on a different issue, that this testifies to a failure of 
the imagination not the general value of thought experiments. But if Mohanty is right, 
the intuitive responses that a peculiar thought experiment evokes from us are unlikely 
to be very helpful in soliciting our views about personal identity, or for clarifying and 
rendering consistent the views that we may already have announced. To put the 
problem another way, it seems clear that thought experiments need to meet some kind 
of sufficient resemblance condition to be effective as an argument for or against a 
given view, and Mohanty’s view is that this condition is frequently lacking. What 
might such a sufficient resemblance condition be? Scientific thought experiments rely 
on one seeing the resemblance between the imagined scenario and an actual 
experiment that might be conducted, and ideally will be. In philosophy, of course, 
things aren’t so simple, but it seems that one needs to see either: 1. a connection to 
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actual experience; or 2. to a large body of existing analytic work on the thought 
experiments in question. Indeed, these scenarios presuppose a shared community of 
experts for their meaning, familiar with the array of conceptual analyses and the 
pitfalls that a given thought experiment entails for particular perspectives. As such, 
they serve as heuristic devices against which views in their neighbourhood are 
sharpened as part of a testing process. The problem with 2 as a sufficient resemblance 
condition, however, is that it is rather uncompelling for any philosophers not already 
enculturated. For those unfamiliar with this background (and not assuming the 
validity of a given conceptual analysis), thought experiments are hence stale and 
deprived of depth. For those in the know, on the other hand, the experiments have 
depth because of the communal work on given problems. That might merely mean 
that continental philosophers should not dismiss what they do not adequately 
understand. But is this experience of philosophical depth that accompanies thought 
experiments genuine or illusory? It can be both. 
But it is also worth highlighting that some of these problems are exacerbated 
when thought experiments are given an explicitly normative or action-guiding 
flavour. Many thought experiments cut out a time-slice wherein one is asked to 
imagine a situation without our past or even projected futural possibilities, and to 
make decisions on the basis of this determination. This highly abstract and ‘thin’ 
scenario is assumed to nonetheless shed light on our ‘thicker’ practical identity. In 
Rawls’ famous ‘veil of ignorance’ thought experiment, for example, we are limited in 
both of the above temporal ways, having neither knowledge of, or an affective 
relation to, our past abilities or interests, and having virtually no knowledge of how 
any futural redistributive arrangements might affect us41, and this also applies to the 
various kinds of thought experiments and rationality paradoxes that one encounters in 
game and decision theory. Bernard Williams generalises this point to claim that 
thought experiments put us in a situation but without our history, including all of the 
associated information and background that we require in order to make choices. As 
such, he suggests that they are exclusively forward thinking; the past is only relevant 
in order to predict the future42. Does this commit what James Williams calls the ‘anti-
genealogical’ fallacy43, that is, to ignore the difficult process of tracing the impact of 
the past within the present (and the future)? Certainly one of the key continental 
rejoinders to any uncritical reliance on the efficacy of thought experiments would be 
that that they give insufficient attention to the memorial traces (including the 
unconscious) that constitute (and challenge) the explicit or implicit supposition of a 
self-interested decision-making agent. If such characterisations can be said to be valid 
in regard to large classes of thought experiment, it might be objected that when 
temporally circumscribed in this manner no real decision is possible. After all, any 
injunction to start from ‘now’, must allow for the phenomena of looking forward to 
the future (protention and anticipation) and looking back to the past (retention) that 
constitute any so-called ‘now’44. This would be another way, then, of putting the 
objection that thought experiments tacitly involve a view from nowhere, or what 
Merleau-Ponty called “high altitude thinking”45, which ignores the conditions of 
possibility of a given thought; our always situated background. Given the growing 
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43Williams, J., The Transversal Thought of Deleuze. 
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acknowledgment within analytic philosophy of many of these meta-philosophical 
limitations, however, the key question is whether analytic philosophers are 
sufficiently cautious in their actual use of such experiments in their work. 
 In opening up this debate about the philosophical value of thought 
experiments it is useful to again consider Deleuze. On his view, they remain dogmatic 
because it is ‘common sense’ that we draw upon to ascertain whether or not the 
particular thought experiment in question gets a grip on a fundamental moral or 
political issue, or is an appropriate way of dealing with the dilemma at hand. We 
recognise that a particular hypothetical scenario – say Plato’s ring of Gyges which 
makes us invisible – stands for a broader problem, in this case the role of fear of 
consequences in preventing human selfishness (this fear is, of course, removed if we 
are invisible since crimes could be committed without worries about being caught and 
punished). A large part of this process depends upon our intuitive response to whether 
the proposed analogy holds, and whether, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson is right 
in claiming that the pro-life position that women do not have a right to abortion is 
analogous to waking up and finding oneself tied to a famous violinist and becoming 
their effective life support without any possibility of freeing oneself from this 
arrangement46. Usually, the abbreviated form of the experiment or analogy means that 
the information that is needed in order to make any such adjudication is not given, but 
we are nonetheless solicited to trust our response. If this is inconsistent with 
something else we have stated about, say abortion, we are then exhorted to modify 
our understanding of the relevant moral and epistemological distinctions in order to 
incorporate that which was revealed by the thought experiment. This is what Deleuze 
calls good sense, where we attempt to resolve a problem by selecting one set of 
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alternatives over another, or at least providing criteria for such adjudication. The 
function of good sense is hence to resolve the question at hand by reference to our 
intuitions on the thought experiment at hand (and its suitability to stand as a marker 
for the more general problem) and to our rational principles, which we then try to 
adjust in order to reach reflective equilibrium. In attempting to decide in this manner, 
however, we run the risk of reducing complex problems to questions which admit of 
clear and distinct answers, something that might be said of the widely cited 
“prisoner’s dilemma” in which the many different social pressures and desires 
confronted by two bank robbers who have been caught and are faced with a 
bargaining situation are simplified into a grid of four possible outcomes47. Likewise, 
Rawls’ famous “veil of ignorance” scenario at times appears to reduce the problem of 
justice to a judgment between the distributive principles of utilitarianism, liberalism, 
and strict egalitarianism. In both of these cases problems are understood in a manner 
that restricts them to a determinate range of possible outcomes; we move from the 
past as complex and unpredictable to the future as simple, predictable, and amenable 
to calculation.  
 Now it might be the case that this is what most academic philosophy amounts 
to, but for Deleuze it does not involve a genuine experiment, and thus cannot result in 
genuine concept creation. Why not? Firstly, because the complicated genesis of the 
intuitions are ignored, and the function ascribed to intuition in this temporally 
circumscribed sense cannot possibly involve a problematisation or critique of the 
socio-political circumstances that have contributed to those intuitions in the first place 
– as such, it will be bound to the preservation of the status quo. Moreover, it is 
assumed that this kind of methodological approach to problems – what would you 
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think if confronted with this scenario? – has independent credibility. But should we 
really trust our responses to an unusual thought experiment, particularly as they 
concern moral and political life? The problem remains that our intuitions about 
strange and abstract cases aren’t likely to be all that reliable, either as a guide to what 
we really would believe (and do) if confronted with such a scenario, or in regard to 
what we ought to believe (and do) in concrete situations of any complexity. On the 
other hand, if we are familiar with the context of a thought experiment, our intuitions 
about the case in question may well be more forthcoming and perhaps even more 
reliable, but only in the sense that they agree with what we already knew. 
 For Deleuze, such a beginning remains pre-critical, within the dogmatic image 
of thought, where subjective presuppositions continue to wield a pernicious influence 
despite the immediate appearance of both strangeness and objectivity. Indeed, most 
thought experiments clearly depend upon common sense as their background. That is, 
they begin with a certain assumption – e.g. we all know that beating animals is bad – 
and then seek to institute more elaborate examples to tease out precisely what our 
commitment to this means and entails. For example, is beating animals still bad if 
they don’t feel pain? We begin from a certain common assumption and then recognise 
that a particular experiment challenges or fits this pre-existing assumption. In taking 
seriously our ordinary intuitions about these kind of non-normal cases, however, we 
also thereby generalise and extend the orbit and significance of convictions that were, 
for Deleuze, produced and moulded in certain particular situations: we subsume the 
singular under the universal, and thereby privilege reflection and contemplation rather 
than an affective and intensive relation to the problem at hand48. Such a 
methodological beginning, with its reliance on our immediate intuitions and what 
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‘everybody knows’, ensures that thought can only orbit around common sense like a 
moon caught in a gravitational pull. For Deleuze, there is no truly critical philosophy 
possible from such a beginning, predicated as it is on certain doxic features, including 
the circumscribed temporal conditions, the reliance upon a generic neutral subject, the 
validity given to one’s pre-theoretic opinions (modelled on the form of recognition), 
and the manner in which thought experiments are condemned to analogical reasoning. 
Of course, they can function by revealing a disanalogy between two cases, but in this 
case it is still a form of analogical thought, one predicated upon bivalence and the 
institution of an opposition. While analogical thinking can be useful for ensuring 
consistency, they are no guarantee of attaining philosophical depth. Of course, 
thought experiments are often just the starting points for analytic philosophers, but 
they usually provide the starting data that is fed into a process of reflective 
equilibrium, and if this data and methodological starting place is faulty then so too 
will be the result. 
 Now, it goes without saying that Deleuze is rather tough on both good and 
common sense (doxa), and it is certainly arguable that his mildly utopian conception 
of philosophy that supports their denigration is itself only one part of philosophy 
rather than its raison d’etre. Must we treat the pragmatisms of good sense and 
common sense (of calculation and intuitive judgments) as harshly as Deleuze does? 
Good sense and common sense may well predominate in the analytic tradition, 
explicitly endorsed by many and implicitly enshrined in the methods of thought 
experiments, intuition, and reflective equilibrium, but it might be credibly argued that 
they are basic and inevitable aspects of thinking. Moreover, it is clear that thought 
experiments can raise important questions and can even provide the provocation for 
the institution of a new philosophical problem. The abstraction from concrete 
situations can have the salutary effect of questioning our everyday assumptions and 
the rigor of the distinctions that we pre-reflectively draw, but, as Deleuze’s work 
suggests, it also has more pernicious possibilities attached to it, particularly when 
relied upon as a prescriptive tool, or when taken to answer a question (or exhaust the 
dimensions of a problem) rather than to pose one. The more difficult and important 
questions then pertain to matters of degree, which must be addressed in relation to the 
work of specific analytic philosophers. To what extent does a particular philosopher’s 
use of thought experiments open up areas of inquiry or artificially close them down? 
But let us move on to the second key method, reflective equilibrium, which often 
accompanies any use of thought experiments and is also deployed in its own right. 
 
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM: COMMON SENSE OR CONSERVATISM?  
 
The most famous and influential formulation of reflective equilibrium is found in 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Drawing on Nelson Goodman’s work49, Rawls uses the 
method of reflective equilibrium in order to explain how we might adjust and perhaps 
even resolve the difference between our moral/political intuitions about what is fair 
and just, and the moral/political theory that is endorsed by our rational judgments 
under the test of the ‘veil of ignorance’. But this technique of argumentation is now 
far from unique to the Rawlsian liberal tradition. In fact, it has recently been 
contended that the method of reflective equilibrium is the generally accepted 
methodology in normative ethics, endorsed by many different kinds of philosopher, 
                                                 
49Goodman suggests that “a rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an 
inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the 
delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the 
agreement achieved lies the only justification needed for either” (Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th 
edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, p64). While it may be a fair method to 
uphold in regard to epistemological justification in the philosophy of science, its importation into the 
realm of political philosophy (which is about more than knowledge) is more contentious. 
including both Kantians and utilitarians50, and regardless of the philosopher’s 
particular views about metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language51. The 
reflective equilibrium process involves the working back and forward between our 
provisional judgments about particular cases (intuitions) and applicable rules 
(principles), with the goal of increasing their coherence, in order to arrive at a more 
reflectively justifiable – if not necessarily final – position. Goodman’s concern in his 
seminal employment of the method is with what Rawls calls ‘narrow’ reflective 
equilibrium – a process of coherence adjustment that concentrates on the judgments, 
rules and background epistemic desiderata that one actually begins with. The intent 
behind Rawls’ own ‘wide’ approach (in A Theory of Justice) is to avoid the 
conservatism inherent in the Goodmanian version of the method. To leave open the 
possibility of a radical shift in our conception of justice, Rawls suggests that we must 
bring into play all imaginable sets of roughly coherent judgments, rules and desiderata 
in some sort of choice situation that is itself governed by such factors, until some sort 
of stable equilibrium is achieved52. To put this another way, there is a difference 
between an understanding of reflective equilibrium that prioritises certain starting 
intuitions or sentiments (which have independent value or credibility), and a reflective 
equilibrium that prioritises overall coherence with our other beliefs (and hence adds to 
this equation dependent credibility), which might include our theories of personal 
identity, human flourishing, rationality, the findings of science, etc.  
                                                 
50See Berys Gaut’s article ‘Justifying Moral Pluralism’ (p147) in Ethical Intuitionism, ed. P. Stratton-
Lake (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), and also Brad Hooker’s claim in ‘Intuitions and Moral 
Theorising’ in the same volume (p161) that most philosophers accept both the idea the method of 
reflective equilibrium and the idea that moral theories are better to the extent that they accord with 
moral claims that are attractive in their own right (i.e. intuitions), especially where they endorse a 
pluralist as opposed to a monist theory of value. 
51Hooker, B., Ideal Code, Real World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p10, 15. He claims this 
also applies to moral particularists (which we might take the poststructuralists to be) because the 
theoretical position that there are no overarching moral or political principles that unify our various 
judgments must nonetheless stand or fall as a claim in relation to the diversity (or otherwise) of our 
intuitive commitments. In that minimal sense reflective equilibria can still be said to obtain. 
52This formulation of Rawls’ position is indebted to James Chase.  
 Now it is clear enough that the narrow version is more conservative than the 
wide version, since certain of our initial beliefs and sentiments have independent 
credibility. Assuming their importance in this way arguably makes the narrow method 
of reflective equilibrium overly invested in the preservation of common sense and 
what is already thought to be known. This is not as clear with the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium, since it necessarily involves a process of perennial updating, 
back and forth adjustments between overarching philosophical views, intuitions, and 
empirical data provided by science. Given that the findings of science are changing all 
the time, it is clear that an analytic philosopher that uses something like the method of 
wide reflective equilibrium and gives significant attention to scientific knowledge, 
must consequently also be prepared to change all of the time53. As such, common 
sense (of a given expert community) does not seem to be conservative. While this is 
certainly true, we should also note that often when reflective equilibrium is invoked 
and claimed to support a given view, no such rigorous process has actually taken 
place. Time, after all, is finite. While our intuitions may theoretically be subject to 
revision in wide reflective equilibrium, when it is recognised that we do not have an 
eternity for decisions and that all of our various beliefs form a part of an intricate 
system of interconnected cultural convictions, it seems eminently unlikely that the 
process will involve anything like a radical challenge to our basic convictions and 
intuitions. After all, even those extra elements that are added to the equation by the 
method of wide equilibrium (such as consistency with the background theories of 
science, etc.) are themselves at least partly constituted by, and inseparable from, the 
basic judgments and convictions of the community we are a part of. Moreover, at any 
particular point in the reflective equilibrium process theoretical coherence is never 
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sufficient on its own but must also cohere with our particular judgments at that time – 
without this equilibrium our considered position has no justification. The methods of 
both wide and narrow reflective equilibrium are hence incoherent without according 
significant value to our everyday intuitions and immediate judgments, and hence, to 
common sense. It might be said that both forms of reflective equilibrium are 
conservative approaches to conceptual analysis because each is an articulation of a 
coherentist conception of justification, and radical transitions tend to pull Neurath’s 
raft to pieces. In addition, this mode of reasoning is dependent on our possession of 
some set of norms of explanatory worthiness, not unlike the Quinean ones we 
considered earlier: simplicity, generality, modesty, refutability and conservatism. Yet 
is this conservatism especially a problem? Among analytic philosophers, the device is 
generally accepted wherever the goal of increasing local coherence (i.e. not achieving 
a completely satisfactory outcome) is thought to be sensible, and even those 
suspicious of coherentist approaches to justification do on occasion try for this54.  
 Although the method of reflective equilibrium clearly bears a structural 
relationship to the dialectic that has a long history in continental philosophy, 
reflective equilibrium constitutes a particular form of the dialectic. Depending on 
one’s perspective, it is either a dialectic that is anchored in existing social practice by 
a common-sense conservatism that tacitly devalues the new and the different, or it 
should be acclaimed for this very feature which allows it to avoid the more pernicious 
forms of relativism (both ethical and epistemological) that can afflict dialectical 
thinking. Indeed, many of the major continental philosophers would have problems 
with the strategy of matching our basic intuitions (or initial judgment about 
particulars) with a general theory, both because of the conservative implications of the 
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‘narrow’ view, and the manner in which the ‘wide’ view supposes that through the 
process of reflective equilibrium we can (and ought to) purge ourselves of any bias 
that might be betrothed to our initial starting point (or basic intuitions, whether moral 
or epistemological). This seems to tacitly reinstate another variation of the rational 
and disinterested subject, in that it quite radically abstracts from the choices we make 
and the way most of us live. Indeed, Carl Knight inadvertently expresses this risk 
when he notes that the subject of any wide reflective equilibrium process “must 
undergo any experiences that may offset biases in his or her formative influences”55. 
This sounds like a noble ambition, but is it tenable, either in the conception of a 
subject that it presupposes, or in the conception of the philosopher that it advocates? 
Both the philosopher and the citizen are modelled on the conceptual personae of the 
judge – as rational, probing, impartial, devoid of affect, etc. Experiences should be 
undergone in order to fairly systematise one’s thoughts and get them in the broadest 
possible equilibrium with one another. Now scientists may do this in their 
experiments (but even then something provoked them to think), but to think that this 
is how philosophy and a good life ought to be conducted is rather more controversial.  
More critically, however, there is a circularity that afflicts the various versions 
of reflective equilibrium. In The Fragmentation of Reason, Stich puts the following 
objection to Goodman’s account of justified inference, and this also applies to 
Rawls’s account:  
What is the relation between rationality and the right test supposed to be, and 
why is the fact that a system of inference passes some test or other supposed to 
show that the system is rational? I think the most plausible answer for a 
Goodmanian to give is that the right test, when we discover it, will be an 
                                                 
55Knight, C., ‘The Method of Reflective Equilibrium: Wide, Radical, Fallible, Plausible’, Philosophical 
Papers, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2006, p222.  
analysis or explication of our ordinary concept of rationality (or some other 
common sense concept of epistemic valuation”56.  
In other words, the test case provides necessary and sufficient conditions for 
rationality because it unpacks our concept of rationality. As Stich points out, however, 
“for this answer to be defensible our common sense concept of rationality must be 
univocal”57. In addition, it must be the case that the procedures used for deciding 
whether a system is rational must exhaust the concept in question without remainder. 
Stich says this cannot be a priori supposed and that it is undermined on empirical 
grounds. Philosophers like Deleuze and Derrida, on the other hand, would seek to 
contests these claims on something like a priori grounds, and through sustained 
analyses of particular concepts and their paradoxical logics.  
 
A ROLE FOR COMMON SENSE (AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS), BUT NOT THE ROLE? 
 
The point behind this essay, then, is that from the perspective of Deleuze a 
methodological reliance on common sense (in offshoots from either Moorean or 
Russellian forms) entails a theoretical conservatism in analytic philosophy. Now, 
there are, of course, many possible rejoinders, perhaps most notably, what is bad 
about being conservative? After all, it is clear that we are and, perhaps should be, 
conservative in various respects. But the important question for us is whether 
philosophy should be structured conservatively. Arguably it is structured 
conservatively, not least because academia is conservative, but whether it should be 
structured thus is another question, and one to which Deleuze thinks the answer is no 
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for reasons I have outlined. Another rejoinder might be that there are various 
problems with Deleuze’s philosophy and with continental philosophy writ large, 
including its own theoretical conservatism despite the ostensible alignment with 
critique and with leftist socio-political causes (discounting Heidegger and Hegel). It is 
undoubtedly true that there are myriad methodological concerns that might be posed 
to continental philosophers about their own insular practices58, but what I want to 
bring out in this paper, through the resources that Deleuze’s meta-philosophy 
provides, is an external perspective on analytic philosophy that opens up questions to 
do with its methodological practice. It seems to me that the critical views expressed 
by Deleuze about the pervasiveness of the dogmatic image of thought – and the co-
imbricated assumption of good and common sense – serve as timely reminders for the 
practice of analytic philosophy today, which is methodologically invested in the value 
of common sense (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly), and such a position 
only makes sense if one assumes that where one is starting from is also good (or at 
least better than the alternatives). In this essay, a commitment to theoretical 
conservatism and common sense has been shown to bound up with the particular 
techniques of thought experimentation and reflective equilibrium. There is a 
chauvinism bound up with these practices (perhaps not unlike the transcendental 
arguments frequently deployed in continental philosophy, but that is another story59) 
                                                 
58See Reynolds, J., “Transcendental Priority and Deleuzian Normativity: Reply to James Williams”, 
Deleuze Studies, Vol. 3, June 2008, “Deleuze’s other-structure: beyond the master-slave dialectic but at 
what cost?”, Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2008, 
p67-88, “Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time (and the Ethics) of the Event”, Deleuze Studies, Vol. 
2, December 2007, p144-66. Many of the key methodological issues at the heart of continental 
philosophy are explored in my forthcoming book, with James Chase, Analytic Versus Continental? 
(Acumen 2010).  
59Transcendental arguments also tend to dogmatically assume conceptual unity. See Kuusela, O., 
“Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism”, International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 16, No.1, 2008, p57-75. The feel of chauvinism is mitigated in some cases of 
transcendental argumentation, however, where the circularity in such arguments is acknowledged. See 
Malpas, J., ‘The Transcendental Circle’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 1, 1997, p1-
and they remain questionable and not necessarily inevitable aspects of any serious 
conception of thought. The uncritical and too prolific use of thought experiments can 
simplify problems to make them amenable for solution and can lead us to see 
analogies where there are really significant differences. They might also play a role in 
leading to a generalising and categorising conception of the task of philosophical 
reflection to the detriment of other possibilities. Likewise, we have seen that the 
technique of reflective equilibrium is a necessarily coherentist approach that depends 
on explanatory norms of worthiness that are indeed useful for some kinds of 
philosophical reflection but not necessarily all. Moreover, there is a circularity to any 
so-called test of reflective equilibrium: it is not a ‘neutral’ test, but involves a 
reinforcement of a given system provided by particular tools found within that 
system. The problem of conservatism in this practice remains. Another way of putting 
this might be to say that those engaging in reflective equilibrium almost inevitably 
find what they are looking for, as in Meno’s paradox. 
But while vigilance about good and common sense and their methodological 
instantiations is undoubtedly called for, it is not clear to me that we can (or should) 
understand the genuine philosophical pursuit as ultimately immured of these aspects. 
Intuitive responses to thought experiments, for example, are undeniably useful for 
showing us the commitments and contradictions within our own thinking and use of 
concepts. And concepts are indeed our way of categorising the world, although we 
might, as Deleuze exhorts us, still try to create new ones that transform our 
apprehension of the world. Copernican revolutions in thought have happened, and 
analytic philosophy should not entirely absolve itself of this hope. The fundamental 
question then would be: is the new possible for analytic philosophy, given its 
                                                                                                                                            
20, and Chase, J., and Reynolds, J., ‘The Fate of the Transcendental’, Postanalytic and 
Metacontinental? Eds. Williams, Mares, Chase, Reynolds, London: Continuum, 2010. 
paradigmatic status and methodological commitment to forms of coherentism and 
theoretical conservatism? On my view it is possible, but improbable, at least without 
further engagement with its continental (and Asian) ‘others’ on methodological 
issues, as well as the value of philosophy more generally; the reverse also holds for 
reasons that cannot be addressed here. This does not entail that such a perspective is 
bankrupt, as a certain reading of Deleuze’s analysis might lead us to believe, but nor 
is a commitment to this kind of theoretical conservatism the only responsible way of 
proceeding in philosophy as at least some analytic philosophers would have us 
believe. There are useful roles for common sense, for the coherentist ‘best fit’ 
approach’ to philosophy, and for many of analytic philosophy’s key associated 
techniques, but to conceive of them as exhausting the essence of philosophy is to 
condemn one’s philosophy. A philosopher must simultaneously be judge and creator, 
rather than the one or the other.  
